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Episode 03 · Essay / History

Shaken,
Not Settled.

From Balfour to October 7th

September 24, 2026 13-minute read

In 1947, the United Nations proposed two states in Palestine. By the end of the war that followed, Israel existed. An independent Palestinian state did not.

That gap survived decades of wars, negotiations, withdrawals, and handshakes. It is tempting to explain it with one villain or one rejected offer. The record demands more: British promises, Arab ambitions, Israeli decisions about security and territory, and Palestinian leaders deciding what compromises they would accept—and what their people would endure without them.

The question running through this history is who had a choice, what they did with it, and who paid. It begins in 1917 and ends on October 7, 2023. The war that followed deserves its own examination.

The turning points

DateWhat changed
1917Britain supported a Jewish national home while promising protection for existing non-Jewish communities.
1947The UN recommended partition into Jewish and Arab states.
1948–49Israel emerged from war; Egypt controlled Gaza and Jordan the West Bank. Palestinians suffered mass displacement.
1967Israel captured Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.
1979Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty; Israeli withdrawal from Sinai followed.
1993Israel and the PLO exchanged recognition letters; Oslo began an interim self-government process.
2000–01Camp David, Clinton's parameters, and Taba ended without a treaty.
2005–07Gaza disengagement, Hamas's election victory, and its armed takeover occurred in three distinct stages.
2023Hamas led the October 7 assault on southern Israel.

Two promises on one piece of paper

In 1917, the Ottoman Empire was losing its hold. Today's independent states had not yet taken their modern form, but Jews, Muslim Arabs, and Christian Arabs already lived there. Changing the borders doesn't make anybody's home imaginary.

In November 1917, British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour sent a letter supporting a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. The same declaration also promised protection for the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities.

Both commitments. One piece of paper. No agreement on how to make them work together.

Modern Zionism already existed. Jews sought a national homeland in a place central to their history, with persecution in Europe making the need for safety painfully immediate. This movement predated Hitler. Arab inhabitants, meanwhile, had homes, political ambitions, and reasons to fear becoming a minority under somebody else's government.

Britain had encouraged Arab expectations of independence while making arrangements with France. Exactly what it had promised to whom became part of the argument. Apparently the people making the promises didn't plan to be the people sorting out the consequences.

After the war, Britain received the Palestine mandate. France received the mandate for Syria and Lebanon. Transjordan was administered separately within Britain's mandate framework, with the Jewish-national-home provisions excluded there.

Jewish immigration and Arab opposition grew. Britain suppressed an Arab revolt by force; a 1937 partition proposal went nowhere. In 1939, Britain sharply restricted Jewish immigration, with further entry after five years dependent on Arab consent.

European Jews were trying to escape Nazi persecution, and one of the places they were trying to reach was closing the door.

A proposed partition becomes a war

The Holocaust made the Jewish refugee crisis devastatingly urgent. Survivors remained in displaced-persons camps. For many, home was where their families had been murdered, with no assurance they would be welcome or safe.

Britain resisted American pressure to admit more refugees. Jewish organizations arranged immigration outside British restrictions. Jewish armed groups also attacked the British, including terrorist attacks. That belongs in this history too.

Britain took the problem to the United Nations. In November 1947, the UN recommended partition into a Jewish state and an Arab state, with Jerusalem under a special international arrangement. The United States and Soviet Union supported it. Britain abstained.

The Jewish Agency accepted partition. The Arab Higher Committee and Arab states rejected it.

Arab opponents asked why outsiders should divide a predominantly Arab country to create a Jewish state. Jewish supporters saw a chance for statehood and refuge that would not depend on another government's permission. These were competing claims to a place where people already lived. Nobody was handing over an empty country.

Resolution 181 remained a recommendation. It did not establish two functioning governments.

Arab and Jewish forces were already fighting before Britain left. On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared Israel's independence. As the mandate ended, Arab armies entered the war. Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon were involved. They opposed the new Jewish state, but their governments had different ambitions for what came next.

Israel survived. Under the 1949 armistices, it controlled more land than the UN proposal had allotted to the Jewish state. Egypt controlled Gaza; Jordan controlled the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

Reading the changing map

The UN's comparison of the 1947 proposal and 1949 armistice lines shows why these boundaries must be kept separate. Its former-mandate outline is a territorial boundary, not a map of private land ownership.

PeriodWhat the map represents
British MandateAdministration before independence; Transjordan was administered separately.
1947Proposed Jewish and Arab states, with a special international arrangement for Jerusalem.
1949Armistice lines after war: Israeli, Egyptian, and Jordanian control.
June 1967Israel's capture of Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.

Later maps of territories occupied since 1967 must be read with their publication dates: they may reflect subsequent withdrawals, including Sinai.

Two national histories, and people who lost their homes

For Israelis, 1948 was the War of Independence. For Palestinians, it was the Nakba: the catastrophe.

Roughly 700,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from Israeli-controlled territory. The circumstances differed from place to place. Homes, property, return, compensation—these became questions every later negotiation inherited.

Some Palestinian Arabs remained inside Israel and became citizens. Many lived under military rule until 1966, needing travel permits. Citizenship did not automatically mean equal treatment.

Across the region, large Jewish communities also left Arab countries. Persecution, violence, expulsions, insecurity, and the attraction of Israel played different roles in different places. Many built new lives in Israel. These histories deserve to be understood individually; one family's loss does not cancel another's.

Meanwhile, Palestinian independence remained unresolved under Arab control too. Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950 and extended citizenship to its Palestinian Arab inhabitants. Egypt administered Gaza without annexing it or making its population Egyptian citizens. Its support for an All-Palestine Government did not produce an effective independent state.

Neither arrangement delivered Palestinian independence. Egypt and Jordan exercised power over these territories and made choices about their future too.

Winning the war left another question

In 1956, the United States pressured Israel, Britain, and France to withdraw after their coordinated attack on Egypt—a reminder that these alliances have never been automatic.

Then came 1967. Egypt moved troops into Sinai, demanded the departure of UN forces, and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Threats and military preparations brought the region to crisis.

On June 5, Israel struck Egypt's airfields, destroying much of its air force on the ground. Jordan joined the fighting that day, shelling Israeli-held West Jerusalem and other targets. Israel counterattacked and captured the West Bank and East Jerusalem. On the northern front, Syrian forces shelled Israeli communities; Israeli air attacks preceded a ground offensive into the Golan Heights on June 9.

After six days, Israel held Sinai and Gaza from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. The 1967 war gave Israel territory and strategic depth. It also placed the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli control.

UN Security Council Resolution 242 connected territorial withdrawal with peace and secure boundaries. What that required became another argument.

Israel had won the war. It now had to decide what to do with the land—and with people who wanted a political future of their own.

Egypt got a treaty. Palestinians still lacked independence.

Egypt and Syria attacked Israeli forces in territory captured in 1967 during the 1973 war. Diplomacy eventually followed.

Egyptian president Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem. Jimmy Carter brought Sadat and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin to Camp David in 1978. The 1979 peace treaty followed, and Israel subsequently withdrew from Sinai.

The Palestinian struggle followed another course. The Palestine Liberation Organization, founded in 1964, came under Yasser Arafat's leadership. Its factions used armed struggle, including attacks on civilians. Its leadership was driven out of Jordan and later out of Lebanon after Israel's 1982 invasion.

That invasion also brought the Sabra and Shatila massacre: Lebanese militiamen killed Palestinian civilians in camps Israeli forces had allowed them to enter.

Egypt had a peace treaty. Palestinians still did not have independence.

A handshake with the hardest questions deferred

The First Intifada began in 1987: protests, strikes, civil resistance, and violence against Israeli rule. Hamas emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood network, combining social services with an armed Islamist movement. Its 1988 charter called for Israel's destruction.

A Congressional Research Service history notes that Israel had tolerated, and sometimes supported, the earlier Islamist network as a counterweight to secular Palestinian groups. That does not establish that Israel created or controlled Hamas. Hamas and Arafat's PLO became rivals.

After the Madrid conference, secret talks in Norway led to Oslo. In the 1993 recognition letters, Arafat recognized Israel's right to exist in peace and security and renounced terrorism. Rabin's government recognized the PLO as the Palestinians' representative.

Oslo established limited Palestinian self-government and the Palestinian Authority. Borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements—the hardest questions were deferred. They were starting the relationship before agreeing on the destination.

Israel made peace with Jordan in 1994, but violence continued within the Israeli-Palestinian process. Hamas suicide bombers murdered Israeli civilians. In Hebron, Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein murdered Palestinian worshippers. Settlements kept expanding under Israeli governments of the left and right, changing the land people were negotiating over.

On November 4, 1995, Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir, a Jewish Israeli opposed to Oslo. You don't have to win an election to make the next compromise harder. Sometimes you murder the person trying to make it.

The offer deserves more than a slogan

In July 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak met Arafat and Bill Clinton at Camp David. The summit failed.

That September, Ariel Sharon visited the contested holy compound known to Jews as the Temple Mount and Muslims as Haram al-Sharif. Protests and deadly clashes followed. The Second Intifada unfolded amid already deep mistrust; its causes remain disputed. Negotiations continued even as the violence grew.

In December, Clinton proposed a Palestinian state in Gaza and the vast majority of the West Bank, with land swaps. It would be nonmilitarized, with an international security presence. Jerusalem would contain both capitals: Palestinian sovereignty in Arab areas, Israeli sovereignty in Jewish areas, with special arrangements for holy sites.

These were December's proposals, five months after Camp David. Treating July, December, and the subsequent talks at Taba as one identical offer distorts the record.

In January 2001, Clinton publicly said both leaders accepted his parameters as a basis for further efforts, with reservations. Palestinian negotiators argued that the terms would leave a fragmented, unviable state and inadequately resolve Jerusalem and refugee rights.

In his later memoir, Clinton was much harsher. He argued that Israel's reservations fit his framework while Arafat's did not, and explained that his public description of acceptance had been part of the effort to keep negotiations alive.

I take that criticism seriously. Arafat owed his people a decision about a country they might actually get. Keeping every demand alive isn't the same as giving people a future.

At Taba in January 2001, negotiators reported unprecedented progress. But time ran out, Israeli leadership changed, and no treaty emerged.

Gaza: withdrawal, an election, and a takeover

The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative offered peace and normal relations in exchange for withdrawal, Palestinian statehood with East Jerusalem as its capital, and an agreed refugee solution. Positions had moved far from 1948, without producing a settlement.

In 2005, Ariel Sharon's government removed every Israeli settlement from Gaza and four in the northern West Bank, forcibly removing settlers who refused to leave. Most West Bank settlements remained.

Israel withdrew its permanent military presence from inside Gaza but retained control over airspace, maritime access, and key access points. Egypt controlled its side of the border.

The Palestinian Authority initially governed: an opportunity to build under Palestinian administration, without unrestricted sovereignty.

In 2006, Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian legislative election. International demands included recognizing Israel, renouncing violence, and accepting earlier agreements. Hamas did not meet them. Its struggle with Fatah turned violent, and in 2007 it forcibly took control of Gaza. The Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas remained based in the West Bank.

Israel greatly tightened restrictions on Gaza, citing security. Egypt also restricted access. Families faced barriers to work, travel, trade, and medical care, documented in OCHA's account of the blockade.

And that 2006 election wasn't a permanent permission slip for whatever Hamas did next.

Managing a conflict that refused to disappear

In 2008, Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert made another serious statehood proposal to Abbas. In later interviews reported by AP, Abbas said he had not accepted because he could not adequately study the map and still objected over refugees. Olmert confirmed that he had pressed for approval that day. No agreement followed.

Later negotiations failed too. By the eve of October 7, hundreds of thousands of Israelis lived in West Bank settlements, even excluding East Jerusalem. The diplomats could postpone the argument. Construction didn't wait for them.

For Palestinians in the West Bank, occupation also meant checkpoints and restrictions that could determine whether they reached their jobs, fields, or medical care. Israeli security concerns were real. So was the disruption to ordinary life, documented in OCHA's August 2023 movement report.

In Gaza, recurring wars brought rocket attacks on Israeli communities and extensive destruction from Israeli attacks. Families lived between rounds of fighting.

Hamas built military tunnels and acquired weapons, supported by Iranian money, arms, and training. International aid also kept civilian services functioning.

What future was Hamas building for people who needed homes, jobs, and schools? Its military preparations kept pointing toward another war.

The 2020 Abraham Accords brought Israeli normalization with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, with other agreements following. A real diplomatic achievement, it left the Israeli-Palestinian conflict unresolved.

Israeli policy toward Gaza relied partly on deterrence and containment: border defenses, military pressure, and economic arrangements intended to make another confrontation less attractive. The belief that the conflict could be kept under control was about to collapse.

October 7, and responsibility

On October 7, 2023, Hamas led an assault from Gaza into southern Israel. Attackers struck military positions, civilian communities, and a music festival. They murdered civilians and took hostages.

Around 1,200 people were killed and more than 250 taken hostage, according to Israeli figures. The dead included civilians and security personnel. These are historical attack totals, not a statement about how many hostages remain captive today.

In March 2024, a UN mission found reasonable grounds to believe that sexual violence, including rape, occurred during the attacks.

The preceding century helps explain the conflict. It does not relieve the people who planned and carried out this attack of responsibility.

A century of leadership choices did not make October 7 inevitable. Hamas chose this attack.

Israel has to answer a different question: how did its defenses fail so completely? A subsequent Israeli military inquiry acknowledged that it had underestimated Hamas and failed to protect civilians, as Reuters reported in February 2025.

Responsibility for committing an attack and responsibility for failing to prevent it are different questions. Both deserve answers.

When we say “I stand with Israel” or “I stand with Palestine,” we ought to be able to explain what we're standing behind—and where we draw the line.

Supporting a people shouldn't mean handing their leaders a blank check.


Adapted from Grimm on the Rocks. The historical narrative ends October 7, 2023; findings from 2024 and 2025 are retrospective evidence.