← Back to the conversation

Episode 01 · Companion article

An Old
Fashioned Lie.

A little truth with a heavy pour of persuasion.

Updated September 24, 2026 Draft for review

From the forthcoming episode of Grimm on the Rocks. The video will be added here when it’s ready.

You see a headline. It confirms what you already suspected. You share it, argue about it, and deliver a remarkably confident explanation of why the other side is full of shit.

Then comes the missing sentence. Or the longer video. Or the expert who was considerably less certain than the headline suggested.

Now you have two problems: you were wrong, and you were really impressive about it.

A story can mislead without every sentence being false. A fact can be genuine while the conclusion attached to it is doing work the evidence cannot support. Being mistaken, selling an argument, and knowingly lying are different things. We ought to keep them different—even when we dislike the person holding the microphone.

I’m not the most neutral man in America. I have opinions. What I want is a conversation where the inconvenient evidence gets a seat at the table.

What are they selling?

In 1929, Edward Bernays helped turn women smoking in public into a statement about freedom. The Easter parade stunt presented cigarettes as “torches of freedom.” His client was American Tobacco. Independence was the appeal; selling cigarettes was the business.1

That is the question I want beside every beautifully packaged political story: what am I being asked to believe, and what does the person selling it get if I do?

It gets harder when the story belongs to your team. Imagine giving thirty years to a political cause: donations, friendships, arguments at Thanksgiving, lessons you taught your kids. An unwelcome fact can sound less like “they were wrong” and more like “I was wrong”—or worse, “they used me.”

That doesn’t mean your principles were worthless or the people you helped didn’t matter. It means thirty years of loyalty doesn’t obligate you to donate another ten to a bad argument.

Nor are we doomed to ignore corrections. Research has found that corrections can reduce political misperceptions, including when the correction is inconvenient to someone’s politics. That is more useful than assuming every challenge makes people dig in forever.2

The laptop, the letter, and the headline

The name Hunter Biden can make people choose a conclusion before they have heard a claim. So let’s separate the pieces.

In October 2020, fifty-one former intelligence officials signed a letter raising the possibility of Russian involvement in the emerging email story. The signers suspected an influence operation, while acknowledging that they had not established whether the emails were genuine. Compare their qualification with the headline that followed.

Read them together · October 19, 2020

The letter’s qualification
“we do not have evidence of Russian involvement”15
Politico’s headline
“Hunter Biden story is Russian disinfo, dozens of former intel officials say.”3

The qualifications mattered. Their presence further down the story did not turn the headline into an accurate description of what the letter established.

There was also a political objective. In interview excerpts published by the Republican-led House Judiciary and Intelligence committees, former acting CIA director Michael Morell described concern about Russian interference and a desire to help Biden. Asked why he wanted Biden to win, he answered: “Because I wanted him to win the election.”4 That documents an electoral motive. It does not establish that every signer knew the suspicion was false.

In her November 2024 account, journalist Catherine Herridge said she brought vetted Hunter Biden records to a senior CBS executive on October 23, 2020. She said her unit received no further laptop assignment before the election, and described the network’s later forensic review in November 2022. She also said she did not know what happened after that initial handoff; CBS had not responded by her deadline.5

I believe CBS knew it had a genuine story that could hurt Biden and buried it before the election. Protecting Biden is the explanation I think fits Herridge’s account and the timing. I cannot establish what was said inside those editorial meetings.

At Hunter Biden’s 2024 gun trial, prosecutors introduced the laptop, and an FBI witness described linking it to him and corroborating communications.6 This does not validate every allegation attached to the laptop. Nor does authentic material, by itself, rule out an influence operation.

But “the material is fabricated” and “someone may be using authentic material to influence an election” are different claims. If we keep switching between them, we can protect a conclusion from almost any evidence.

When uncertainty became a mushroom cloud

In October 2002, President George W. Bush framed waiting for definitive proof of Iraq’s nuclear threat as risking a “mushroom cloud.”7 It was a powerful argument: uncertainty itself became a reason to act before the worst happened.

The Senate Intelligence Committee’s 2008 majority findings concluded that significant prewar claims were unsupported by, or contradicted, the available intelligence. The report passed 10–5 with bipartisan support. Vice Chairman Kit Bond disputed the process and conclusions, arguing that officials had relied on flawed intelligence and calling the report political theater.89

One claim, checked against the record

Bush’s public claim · October 7, 2002
“We’ve learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases.”7
The Senate committee’s finding · June 5, 2008
The committee concluded that claims by Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell suggesting an Iraq–al-Qaeda partnership or Iraqi weapons training for al-Qaeda were not supported by the intelligence.8

This comparison concerns what the intelligence supported when officials made their case—not simply what investigators found after the invasion.

Those disagreements belong in the record. So does the fact that skeptical reporting existed before the invasion. Knight Ridder reporters questioned the administration’s case while the decision was still being made.10 Doubt wasn’t invented afterward.

My judgment is that the administration deliberately oversold the threat because it wanted a war in Iraq and needed the public behind it. Why it wanted that war, and how motives differed inside the administration, I cannot settle here.

The stakes were enormous. A 2023 Brown University Costs of War estimate put the combined cost of the Iraq and Syria wars at nearly $2.9 trillion, including projected veterans’ care through 2050.11

The public needed the uncertainty while there was still a decision to make.

The test has to include my side

I am an American Jew. I support Israel, and I support the U.S.–Israeli campaign against Iran. Those are my positions. They are not evidence for every claim made in support of that campaign.

That is where this exercise has to get uncomfortable.

In a February 2026 interview, Steve Witkoff described Iran as “probably a week away from having industrial-grade bomb-making material.”12 That is a claim about material, not a completed weapon. It is also a dated statement, not a countdown that can simply be repeated months later.

I hear echoes of the urgency used before Iraq. An echo is not proof that the threat is false. It is a reason to ask more precise questions.

In its September 7 statement, the IAEA described serious gaps in access and information that prevented it from carrying out required verification work in Iran.13 Those gaps are a serious proliferation concern. They are neither a clean bill of health nor a verified timetable for a finished bomb.

The public evidence reviewed for this article does not establish that timetable. I have not reviewed all classified intelligence, and I am not claiming to have disproved a threat. I am saying my support cannot do the work of evidence.

A dated snapshot, not a live update

Reuters reported indirect U.S.–Iran talks on September 23, 2026, with disputes over the blockade still unresolved. This article reflects that reporting date; it does not presume a settlement.14

I want a clear, achievable objective and an end. What are we spending money and lives to accomplish? What would count as success? Supporting a military decision does not require accepting a sales pitch whose objective can change for years.

If I demand those answers from people I oppose, I have to demand them from people I support.

Leave room to be wrong

Being wrong, overstating a case, and knowingly lying are different failures. If we want better arguments, we have to keep those distinctions even when a simpler accusation would feel better.

You shouldn’t need a second job to work out whether a headline deserves your confidence. That is why the sources are here, including the dissent and the limits of what they establish. If a fact changes, the article should say what changed—and whether it changes the conclusion.

So the next time a headline settles everything for you, give it a minute.

Read the sentence after the one everybody’s quoting.

Follow the evidence

Sources & notes

These links support the factual discussion; they do not establish every judgment about motive. This companion draft is adapted from Episode 1, script Draft 0.16.

  1. Hoover Presidential Library / National Archives: Bernays and public relations ↗

    Thomas F. Schwartz, July 5, 2017. Historical account describing the 1929 smoking stunt and American Tobacco sponsorship.

  2. Ecker, Sze & Andreotta: Corrections of political misinformation ↗

    2021 research on correction effectiveness and political congruence. Supports the narrower point that corrections can work, not a promise that every correction persuades every reader.

  3. Politico’s October 2020 reporting ↗

    Natasha Bertrand, October 19, 2020. Compare the headline with the original letter linked in source 15. Archived copy ↗

  4. House committee report on the October 2020 statement (PDF) ↗

    Republican-led Judiciary and Intelligence committees, May 10, 2023. Morell’s April 4 interview excerpts appear on pp. 10–11 and 46–47. These are excerpts reproduced in a committee report, not a full interview transcript or a neutral adjudication.

  5. Catherine Herridge’s firsthand account of the CBS laptop reporting ↗

    November 3, 2024. The account supports what Herridge says she presented and experienced; it does not independently establish the executives’ motives. The CBS response status is as reported in her article.

  6. ABC News: Laptop introduced at Hunter Biden’s trial ↗

    June 4, 2024 live coverage. Reports FBI testimony about ownership and corroboration; not blanket verification of every circulating laptop claim.

  7. President Bush’s Cincinnati address ↗

    White House transcript, October 7, 2002. Primary source for the administration’s public argument about Iraq.

  8. Senate Intelligence Committee: Final Phase II findings ↗

    June 5, 2008. Majority summary of the comparison between prewar public statements and available intelligence. Its first listed conclusion addresses the partnership and weapons-training claims quoted above.

  9. Senator Kit Bond’s dissent ↗

    June 5, 2008. Included so readers can inspect the committee leadership’s competing interpretation.

  10. Bill Moyers Journal: Buying the War ↗

    PBS retrospective on prewar reporting, including Knight Ridder’s skepticism. A later examination of reporting that preceded the invasion.

  11. Neta C. Crawford: Blood and Treasure (PDF) ↗

    Brown University Costs of War, March 15, 2023. Nearly $2.9 trillion combines Iraq and Syria costs with projected veterans’ care through 2050; see the summary and cost table.

  12. Steve Witkoff interview excerpt ↗

    RealClearPolitics, February 26, 2026. Source for Witkoff’s words, not independent verification of his estimate. Material production and a completed weapon are distinct claims.

  13. IAEA Director General’s introductory statement ↗

    September 7, 2026, reproduced by Iran Watch. Describes safeguards access and information gaps; those gaps do not supply a verified bomb timetable.

  14. Reuters: U.S.–Iran shuttle talks ↗

    September 23, 2026. Dated diplomatic context for the Iran section, not a live status feed.

  15. Public Statement on the Hunter Biden Emails (PDF) ↗

    October 19, 2020, preserved in House hearing materials. Page 1 contains the signers’ suspicion of a Russian information operation and their explicit acknowledgment that they lacked evidence of Russian involvement.

Room to be wrong

Corrections & updates

Found a factual error or a source we should consider? Open Grimm on the Rocks on Instagram ↗ and send us a message with the article title, the passage, and a link to the evidence. Instagram sign-in may be required.

Substantive corrections will be recorded here with the date, what changed, and whether the change affects the argument.

September 24, 2026 · Editorial revision

Added the original intelligence letter and a direct comparison with Politico’s headline; added Bush’s weapons-training claim beside the Senate committee’s finding; trimmed repeated qualifications and a spoken joke; added this corrections section. The author’s conclusions are unchanged.

Keep the conversation going

Pull up a chair.

Strong opinions. Hard questions. Room to be wrong.

Visit the YouTube channel ↗